A precise characterization of those security policies enforceable by program rewriting is given. This also exposes and rectifies problems in prior work, yielding a better characterization of those security policies enforceable by execution monitors as well as a taxonomy of enforceable security policies. Some but not all classes can be identified with known classes from computational complexity theory. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or direct commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 1515 Broadway, New York, NY 10036 USA, fax: +1 (212) 869-0481, or permissions@acm.org. 
INTRODUCTION
Extensible systems, such as web browsers, which download and run applet programs, or operating systems, which incorporate drivers for new devices, must ensure that their extensions behave in a manner consistent with the intentions of the system designer and its users. When unacceptable behavior goes unchecked, damage can result-not only to the system itself but also to connected systems.
Security enforcement mechanisms are employed to prevent unacceptable behavior. Recently, attention has turned to formally characterizing types of enforcement mechanisms and identifying the classes of security policies they can enforce [Ligatti et al. 2003; Schneider 2000; Viswanathan 2000 ]. This work allows us to assess the power of different mechanisms, choose mechanisms well suited to particular security needs, identify kinds of attacks that might still succeed even after a given mechanism has been deployed, and derive meaningful completeness results for newly developed mechanisms.
The abstract model for security policies developed by Schneider [2000] and refined by Viswanathan [2000] characterizes a class of policies meant to capture what could be effectively enforced through execution monitoring. Execution monitors are enforcement mechanisms that work by monitoring the computational steps of untrusted programs and intervening whenever execution is about to violate the security policy being enforced. Execution monitoring, however, can be viewed as an instance of the more general technique of program-rewriting, wherein the enforcement mechanism transforms untrusted programs before they are executed so as to render them incapable of violating the security policy to be enforced. To our knowledge, no characterization of the class of security policies enforceable by program-rewriting has been developed. Since numerous systems [Deutsch and Grant 1971; Small 1997; Wahbe et al. 1993; Schneider 2000a, 2000b; Evans and Twynman 1999] use program-rewriting in ways that go beyond what can be modeled as an execution monitor, a characterization of the class of policies enforceable by program-rewriters would be useful. So we here extend Schneider's and Viswanathan's model to characterize this new class of policies, the RWenforceable policies, corresponding to what can be effectively enforced through program-rewriting.
Execution monitoring can be viewed as an instance of program-rewriting, so one would expect the class EM orig of policies characterized by Schneider and Viswanathan to be a subclass of the RW-enforceable policies. However, we show that surprisingly this is not the case; there are some policies in EM orig that are not enforceable by any program-rewriter. Our analysis of these policies shows that they cannot actually be enforced by an execution monitor either, revealing that EM orig actually constitutes an upper bound on the class of policies enforceable by execution monitors instead of an exact bound, as was previously thought. We then show that intersecting EM orig with the RW-enforceable policies yields exactly those policies that can actually be enforced by an execution monitor, the EM-enforceable policies.
We proceed as follows. We establish a formal model of security enforcement in Section 2. Next, in Section 3 we use that model to characterize and relate three methods of security enforcement: static analysis, execution monitoring, and program rewriting. Using the results of these analyses, Section 4 exposes and corrects flaws in prior work that cause Schneider's and Viswanathan's class to admit policies not enforceable by any execution monitor. Related and future work is discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the results of the prior sections.
FORMAL MODEL OF SECURITY ENFORCEMENT

Programs and Executions
An enforcement mechanism prevents unacceptable behavior by untrusted programs. Fundamental limits on what an enforcement mechanism can prevent arise whenever that mechanism is built using computational systems no more powerful than the systems upon which the untrusted programs themselves are based, because the incompleteness results of Gödel [1931] and Turing [1936] then imply there will be questions about untrusted programs unanswerable by the enforcement mechanism.
To expose these unanswerable questions, untrusted programs must be represented using some model of computation. The Turing Machine (TM) [Turing 1936 ] is an obvious candidate because it is well understood and because a wide range of security policies can be encoded as properties of Turing Machines [Marcus 1989; Harrison et al. 1976] .
Recall, a TM has a finite control comprising a set of states and a transition relation over those states. A computational step occurs whenever a TM moves from one finite control state to another (possibly the same) finite control state in accordance with its transition relation.
However, there are two reasons that the traditional definition of a TM, as a one-tape finite state machine that accepts or rejects finite-length input strings, is unsuitable for representing untrusted programs. First, it does not model nonterminating programs well. Operating systems, which are programs intended to run indefinitely, are not easily characterized in terms of acceptance or rejection of a finite input. Second, the traditional definition of a TM does not easily distinguish runtime information that is observable by the outside world (e.g. by an enforcement mechanism) from runtime information that is not observable because all runtime information is typically encoded on a single tape. Any realistic model of execution monitoring must be rich enough to express the monitor's limited power to access some but not all information about the untrusted program as it runs.
Therefore, untrusted programs are modeled in this article by a multitape variant of a traditional TM (multitape TMs being equivalent in computational power to single-tape TMs [Hopcroft and Ullman 1979, p. 161] ), which we term a program machine (PM). PMs are deterministic TMs (i.e. TMs with deterministic transition relations) that manipulate three infinite-length tapes: -An input tape, which contains information initially unavailable to the enforcement mechanism: user input, nondeterministic choice outcomes, and any other information that only becomes available to the program as its execution progresses. Nondeterminism in an untrusted program is modeled by using the input tape contents, even though PMs are themselves deterministic. Input tapes may contain any finite or infinite string over some fixed, finite alphabet ; the set of all (finite-length and infinite-length) input strings is denoted by ω .
-A work tape, which is initially blank and can be read or written by the PM without restriction. It models work space provided to the program at runtime and is not directly available to the enforcement mechanism. -A write-only trace tape, discussed more thoroughly below, which records security-relevant behavior by the PM that can be observed by the enforcement mechanism.
Separation of a PMs runtime information into these three tapes allows us to provide PMs infinite-length input strings on their input tapes, and allows the model to distinguish information that is available to the enforcement mechanism from information that is not. As a PM runs, it exhibits a sequence of events observable to the enforcement mechanism by writing encodings of those events on its trace tape. For example, if "the PM writing a 1 to its work tape" is an event that the enforcement mechanism will observe, and the encoding of this event is "0001", then the string "0001" is automatically written by the PM to its trace tape whenever that PM writes a 1 to its work tape.
As the example suggests, we assume a fixed universe of all observerable events E and assume that their encodings do not vary from PM to PM. Assuming a fixed set E allows our model to distinguish between information observable by the enforcement mechanism and information that is not observable. It can be used to specify that some information might never be available to an enforcement mechanism and that other information, like user inputs or nondeterministic choices, only becomes available to the enforcement mechanism at a particular point during execution. The result is a model that distinguishes between two different (but often conflated) reasons among the many reasons why an enforcement mechanism might fail to enforce a particular security policy: -The enforcement mechanism could fail because it lacks the ability to observe events critical to the enforcement of the policy. In that case, E is inadequate to enforce the policy no matter which enforcement mechanism is employed. -The enforcement mechanism could fail because it lacks sufficient computational power to prevent a policy violation given the available information. In this case, where one enforcement mechanism fails, another might succeed.
Although we do not fix a specific set E, we will make several assumptions about E that allow us to model the predictive power of enforcement mechanisms of interest in this article. In particular, enforcement mechanisms that seek to prevent security policy violations before they occur must always have some ability to predict an untrusted program's behavior finitely far into the future on any given input. For example, execution monitors must be able to look ahead at least one computational step on all possible control flow paths to see if a security-relevent event might next be exhibited. Without this ability, they have no opportunity to intercept bad events before they occur. This predictive power is, of course, limited by the information available to the enforcement mechanism. An enforcement mechanism cannot necessarily determine which (if any) event will be exhibited next if the untrusted program is about to read input, but we will assume that it can determine which event would be exhibited next for any given input symbol the untrusted program might read. This prediction will be repeatable for a finite number of iterations to predict the outcome of any given finite sequence of inputs that the untrusted program might encounter. The following assumptions about E suffice to model this predictive power.
-E is a countably infinite set, allowing each event to be unambiguously encoded as a finite sequence of symbols on a PMs trace tape. -Reading a symbol from the input tape is always an observable event. Thus for each input symbol s ∈ , there is an event e s ∈ E that corresponds to reading s from the input tape. -For each PM M , there is an event e M that encodes M , including the finite control and transition relation of M . 1 This corresponds to the assumption that the enforcement mechanism can access the untrusted program's text to make finite predictions about its future behavior. A means for the enforcement mechanism to use event e M to make these predictions will be given shortly.
A weaker set of assumptions about E that permits enforcement mechanisms access to less information, but that still captures the predictive power of interesting enforcement mechanisms might be possible but is left as future work. Independent work on this problem [Fong 2004 ] is discussed in Section 5.
Following Schneider [2000] , program executions are modeled as sequences χ of events from E. Without loss of generality, we assume that complete executions are always infinite event sequences. (If an untrusted program's termination is an observable event, then it can be modeled by a PM that loops, repeatedly exhibiting a distinguished event e end , instead of terminating. If program termination is not observable, E can be augmented with an event e skip that indicates that either the untrusted program has terminated or that no security-relevant event has taken place on a particular computational step.) Many of our analyses will involve both complete executions and their finite prefixes, and we use χ to refer to both infinite and finite event sequences unless explicitly stated otherwise. Each finite prefix of an execution encodes the information available to the enforcement mechanism up to that point in the execution. Define | · | : E ω → (N ∪ {∞}) such that |χ | is the length of sequence χ if χ is finite, and |χ | is ∞ if χ is infinite. When i ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ |χ | then let χ [i] denote the ith event of χ , let χ [..i] denote the length-i prefix of χ , and let χ [i + 1..] denote the suffix of χ consisting of all but the first i events.
• K. W. Hamlen et al.
Executions exhibited by a PM are recorded on the PMs trace tape. As the PM runs, a sequence of symbols gets written to the trace tape-one (finite) string of symbols for each event e ∈ E the PM exhibits. If the PM terminates, then the encoding of e end or e skip is used to pad the remainder of the (infinite-length) trace tape. Let χ M (σ ) denote the execution written to the trace tape when PM M is run on input tape σ . Let X M denote the set of all possible executions exhibited by a PM M (viz {χ M (σ ) |σ ∈ ω }), and let X − M denote the set of all nonempty finite prefixes of
To provide enforcement mechanisms with the ability to anticipate the possible exhibition of security-relevant events, we assume that the first event of every execution exhibited by M is event e M . Thus, we assume that there exists a computable function · from executions to PMs such that
Although the existence of a function · that maps executions to the PMs that generated them is a realistic assumption, in so far as enforcement mechanisms located in the processor or operating system have access to the program, only superficial use has been made of this information in actual execution monitor implementations to date. For example, reference monitors in kernels typically do not perform significant analyses of the text of the untrusted programs they monitor. Instead they use hardware interrupts or other instrumentation techniques that consider only single program instructions in isolation. Eliminating from our formal model the assumption that · exists, would require a model in which the computational details of PMs are more elaborate, because the model would need to allow enforcement mechanisms to examine enough of a PM to predict security-relevant events before they occur but not enough to recover all of the PMs finite control. We conjecture that such an elaboration of our model would result in only trivial changes to the results derived in this article, but a proper analysis is left to future work.
To ensure that a trace tape accurately records an execution, the usual operational semantics of TMs, which dictates how the finite control of an arbitrary machine behaves on an arbitrary input, is augmented with a fixed trace mapping (M , σ ) → χ M (σ ) such that the trace tape unambiguously records the execution that results from running an arbitrary PM M on an arbitrary input σ .
The appendix provides a formal operational semantics for PMs, an example event set, and an example trace mapping satisfying the constraints given above.
Security Policies
A security policy defines a binary partition on the set of all computable sets of executions. Each computable set of executions corresponds to a PM, so a security policy divides the set of all PMs into those that satisfy the policy and those that do not. This definition of security policies is broad enough to express most things usually considered security policies [Schneider 2000 ], including -access control policies, which are defined in terms of a program's behavior on an arbitrary individual execution for an arbitrary finite period, -availability policies, which are defined in terms of a program's behavior on an arbitrary individual execution over an infinite period, and -information flow policies, which are defined in terms of the set of all executions-and not the individual executions in isolation-that a program could possibly exhibit.
Given a security policy P, we write P(M ) to denote that M satisfies the policy and ¬P(M ) to denote that it does not. For example, if cells 0 through 511 of the work tape model the boot sector of a hard disk, and we have defined E such that a PM exhibits event e writes(i) ∈ E whenever it writes to cell i of its work tape, then we might be interested in the security policy P boot that is satisfied by exactly those PMs that never write to any of cells 0 through 511 of the work tape. More formally, P boot (M ) holds if and only if for all σ ∈ ω , execution χ M (σ ) does not contain any of events e writes(i) for 0 ≤ i < 512. Security policies are often specified in terms of individual executions they prohibit. LettingP be a predicate over executions, the security policy P induced byP is defined by:
That is, a PM M satisfies a security policy P if and only if all possible executions of M satisfy predicateP.P is called a detector for P. For example, if we define a detectorP boot (χ ) to hold exactly when χ does not contain any event e writes(i) for 0 ≤ i < 512, then policy P boot (above) is the policy induced by detectorP boot .
The detectorP boot can be decided 2 for a finite execution prefix χ by verifying that χ does not contain any of a set of prohibited events, namely e writes(i) for 0 ≤ i < 512. Such detectors are often useful, so for any set of events B ⊆ E to be prohibited, we define 3 :P B (χ ) = def (∀e : e ∈ χ : e ∈ B).
The policy P B induced byP B is satisfied by exactly those PMs that never exhibit an event from B. Policy P boot can then be expressed as P {e writes(i) |0≤i<512} .
MODELING VARIOUS SECURITY ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
The framework defined in Section 2 can be used to model many security enforcement mechanisms, including static analyses (c.f. [Lindholm and Yellin 1999, Chapter 4.9.1, Passes 1-3; Morrisett et al. 1999; Myers 1999; Nachenberg 1997] ), reference monitors (c.f. [Anderson 1972; Lampson 1971; Lindholm and Yellin 1999, Chapter 4.9.1, Pass 4; Rees and Clinger 1991; Kim et al. 2001] ), and program rewriters (c.f. [Deutsch and Grant 1971; Schneider 2000a, 2000b; Evans and Twynman 1999; Small 1997; Wahbe et al. 1993] ). 2 We say a predicate can be decided or is recursively decidable if and only if there exists an algorithm that, for any finite-length element, terminates and returns 1 if the element satisfies the predicate, and terminates and returns 0 otherwise. 3 We write e ∈ χ holds if and only if event e is in execution χ; i.e. e ∈ χ = def (∃i : 0 ≤ i : e = χ [i]).
Static Analysis
Enforcement mechanisms that accept or reject an untrusted program strictly prior to running the untrusted program are termed static analyses. Here, the enforcement mechanism must determine whether the untrusted program satisfies the security policy within a finite period of time. 4 Accepted programs are permitted to run unhindered; rejected programs are not run at all. Examples of static analyses include static type-checkers for type-safe languages, like that of the Java Virtual Machine 5 [Lindholm and Yellin 1999, Chapter 4.9 .1, Passes 1-3] and TAL [Morrisett et al. 1999] . JFlow [Myers 1999 ] and others use static analyses to provide guarantees about other security policies such as information flow. Standard virus scanners [Nachenberg 1997 Class 0 is well-studied, so there is a theoretical foundation for statically enforceable security policies. Statically enforceable policies include: "M terminates within 100 computational steps," "M has less than one million states in its finite control," and "M writes no output within the first 20 steps of computation." For example, since a PM could read at most the first 100 symbols of its input tape within the first 100 computational steps, and since is finite, the first of the above policies could be decided in finite time for an arbitrary PM by simulating it on every length-100 input string for at most 100 computational steps to see if it terminates. Policies that are not statically enforceable include, "M eventually terminates," "M writes no output when given σ as input," and "M never terminates." None of these are recursively decidable for arbitrary PMs.
Static analyses can also prevent PMs from violating security policies that are not recursively decideable, but only by enforcing policies that are conservative approximations of those policies. For example, a static analysis could prevent PMs from violating the policy, "M eventually terminates," by accepting only PMs that terminate within 100 computational steps. However, in doing so it would conservatively reject some PMs that satisfy the policy-specifically, those that terminate after more then 100 computational steps.
Execution Monitoring
Reference monitors [Anderson 1972; Ware 1979 ] and other enforcement mechanisms that operate alongside an untrusted program are termed execution monitors (EMs) in Schneider [2000] . An EM intercepts security-relevant events exhibited as the untrusted program executes, and the EM intervenes upon seeing an event that would lead to a violation of the policy being enforced. The intervention might involve terminating the untrusted program or might involve taking some other corrective action.
6 Examples of EM enforcement mechanisms include access control list and capability-based implementations of access control matrices [Lampson 1971 ] as well as hardware support for memory protection. Runtime linking performed by the Java Virtual Machine [Lindholm and Yellin 1999, Chapter 4.9.1, Pass 4], and runtime type-checking such as that employed by dynamically typed languages like Scheme [Rees and Clinger 1991] , are other examples. The MaC system [Kim et al. 2001] implements EMs through a combination of runtime event-checking and program instrumentation.
Schneider [2000] observes that for every EM-enforceable security policy P there will exist a detectorP such that
and thus the EM-enforceable policies are a subset of the safety properties.
7 Viswanathan [2000] observes thatP must also be computable (something left implicit in Schneider [2000] ), giving rise to a fourth restriction: P(χ ) is recursively decidable whenever χ is finite.
We refer to the class of security policies given by EM1-EM4 as the class EM orig . A security policy P in EM orig can then be enforced by decidingP at each computational step. Specifically, as soon as the next exhibited event, if permitted, would yield an execution prefix that violatesP, the EM intervenes to prohibit the event. EM4 is critical because it rules out detectors that are arbitrarily powerful and thus not available to any real EM implementation. For example, the policy that a PM must eventually halt-a liveness property that no EM can enforce [Lamport 1977; Schneider 2000 ]-satisfies EM1-EM3 but not EM4.
In Section 4.1 we show that real EMs are limited by additional constraints. However, class EM orig constitutes a useful upper bound on the set of policies enforceable by execution monitors. Viswanathan [2000] shows that EM orig is equivalent to the corecursively enumerable (coRE) properties, also known as class 1 of the arithmetic hierarchy. A security policy P is coRE when there exists a TM M P that takes an arbitrary PM M as input and rejects it in finite time if ¬P(M ) holds; otherwise M P (M ) loops forever. The equivalence of EM orig to the coRE properties will be used throughout the remainder of the article. Since Viswanathan's model differs substantially from ours, we reprove this result for our model. PROOF. First we show that every policy satisfying EM1-EM4 is coRE. Let a policy P satisfying EM1-EM4 be given. Security policy P is, by definition, coRE if there exists a TM M P that takes an arbitrary PM M as input and loops forever if P(M ) holds but otherwise halts in finite time. To prove that P is coRE, we construct such an M P .
By EM1, P(M ) ≡ (∀χ : χ ∈ X M :P(χ )) for someP satisfying EM2-EM4. EM4 guarantees that a TM can decideP(χ ) for finite χ . We can therefore construct M P , as follows: When given M as input, M P begins to iterate through every finite prefix χ of executions in X M . For each, it decidesP(χ ). If it finds a χ such that ¬P(χ ) holds, it halts. (This is possible because EM4 guarantees thatP(χ ) is recursively decidable.) Otherwise it continues iterating indefinitely.
If P(M ) holds, then by EM1, there is no χ ∈ X M such that ¬P(χ ) holds. Thus, by EM2, there is no i such that ¬P(χ [..i]) holds. Therefore M P will loop forever. But if P(M ) does not hold, then by EM1 and EM3 there is some χ and some i such that ¬P(χ [..i]) holds. Therefore M P will eventually terminate. Thus, M P is a witness to the fact that policy P is coRE.
Second, we show that every coRE security policy satisfies EM1-EM4. Let a security policy P that is coRE be given. That is, assume there exists a TM M P such that if P(M ) holds then M P (M ) runs forever; otherwise M P (M ) halts in finite time. We wish to show that there exists someP satisfying EM1-EM4. DefineP(χ ) to be true iff M P ( χ ) does not halt in |χ | steps or less. If χ is infinite, thenP(χ ) is true if and only if M P ( χ ) never halts.
P satisfies EM2 because if M P ( χ ) does halt in |χ | steps or less, then it will also halt in j steps or less whenever j ≥ |χ |.P satisfies EM3 because if M P ( χ ) ever halts, it will halt after some finite number of steps.P satisfies EM4 because whenever χ is of finite length, M P ( χ ) can be simulated for |χ | steps in finite time. Finally,P satisfies EM1 because all and only those PMs χ that do not satisfy P cause M P to halt in time |χ | for some (sufficiently long) χ .
Since the coRE properties are a proper superset of the recursively decidable properties [Papadimitriou 1995, p. 63] , every statically enforceable policy is trivially enforceable by an EM-the static analysis would be performed by the EM immediately after the PM exhibits its first event (i.e., immediately after the program is loaded). Statically enforceable policies are guaranteed to be computable in a finite period of time, so the EM will always be able to perform this check in finite time and terminate the untrusted PM if the check fails.
Even though the power of the EM approach is strictly greater than that of the static approach, this does not mean that the EM approach is to be universally preferred over the static approach. Depending on the policy to be enforced, either approach might be preferable to the other for engineering reasons. For example, static enforcement mechanisms predict policy violations before a program is run and therefore do not slow the program, whereas EMs usually slow execution due to their added runtime checks. Also, an EM might signal security policy violations arbitrarily late into an execution and only on some executions, whereas a static analysis reveals prior to execution whether that program could violate the policy. Thus, recovering from policy violations discovered by an EM can be more difficult than recovering from those discovered by a static analysis. In particular, an EM might need to roll back a partially completed computation, whereas a static analysis always discovers the violation before computation begins. Alternatively, some policies, though enforceable by a static analysis, are simpler to enforce with an EM, reducing the risk of implementation errors in the enforcement mechanism. Moreover, the comparison of static enforcement to EM-enforcement given in Theorem 3.2.1 assumes that both are being given the same information (because in our model an EM can examine the untrusted program via event e M ). If a static analysis is provided one representation of the program (e.g., source code) and an EM is provided another in which some of the information has been erased (e.g., object code), then each might well be able to enforce policies that the other cannot.
Theorem 3.2.1 also suggests that there are policies enforceable by EMs that are not statically enforceable, since 0 ⊂ 1 . Policy P boot given in Section 2.2 is an example. More generally, assuring that a PM will never exhibit some prohibited event is equivalent to solving the Halting Problem, which is known to be undecidable and therefore is not statically enforceable. EMs enforce such "undecidable" security policies by waiting until a prohibited event is about to occur, and then signaling the violation.
The relationship of the static policies to class EM orig is depicted in Figure 1 .
Program Rewriting and RW ≈ -Enforceable Policies
An alternative to static analysis or execution monitoring is program rewriting. A program-rewriter modifies, in finite time, untrusted programs prior to their execution. Use of program rewriting for enforcing security policies dates back at least to 1969 [Deutsch and Grant 1971] . More recently, we find program rewriting being employed in software-based fault-isolation (SFI) [Small 1997; Wahbe et al. 1993 ] as a way of implementing memory-safety policies, and in PSLang/PoET [Erlingsson and Schneider 2000a] and Naccio [Evans and Twynman 1999] for enforcing security policies in Java. Program-rewriters can also be seen as a generalization of execution monitoring, since they can be used to implement an EM as an in-lined reference monitor (IRM) whereby an EM is embedded into the untrusted program [Erlingsson and Schneider 2000b] . The approach is appealing, powerful, and quite practical, so understanding what policies it can enforce is a worthwhile goal. Implicit in program rewriting is some notion of program equivalence that constrains the program transformations a program rewriter performs. Executions of the program that results from program rewriting must have some correspondence to executions of the original. We specify this correspondence in terms of an equivalence relation ≈ over PMs. Since there are many notions of PM-equivalence that might be suitable, we leave the definition open, defining relation ≈ in terms of an unspecified equivalence relation ≈ χ on executions:
Given a PM-equivalence relation, we define a policy P to be RW ≈ -enforceable if there exists a total, computable rewriter function R : PM → PM such that for all PMs M ,
Thus, for a security policy P to be considered RW ≈ -enforceable, there must exist a way to transform a PM so that the result is guaranteed to satisfy P (RW1) and if the original PM already satisfied P, then the transformed PM is equivalent (but not necessarily identical) to the old (RW2). It is important to note that RW1 precludes a program-rewriter from producing as output any PM that does not satisfy the policy. As we shall see in Section 4, this requirement leads to a subtle but important distinction between the class of RW ≈ -enforceable policies and EM orig . Equivalence relation ≈ χ in PM-equivalence is defined independently of any security policy, but the choice of any particular ≈ χ places an implicit constraint on which detectors can be considered in any of our analyses of policies enforceable by detectors. In particular, it is sensible to consider only those detectorsP that satisfy
Such a detector will be said to be consistent with ≈ χ since it never classifies one execution as acceptable and another as unacceptable when the two are equivalent according to ≈ χ . Program rewriters presume equivalent executions are interchangeable, which obviously isn't the case if one execution is acceptable and the other is not. Thus, detectors that are not consistent with ≈ χ are not compatible with the model. In an analysis of any particular enforcement mechanism involving detectors, ≈ χ should be defined in such a way that all detectors supported by the mechanism are consistent with ≈ χ , and are therefore covered by the analysis. The class of RW ≈ -enforceable policies includes virtually all statically enforceable policies.
8 This is because given a statically enforceable policy P, a rewriter function exists that can decide P directly-that rewriter function returns unchanged any PM that satisfies the policy and returns some safe PM (such as a PM that outputs an error message and terminates) in place of any PM that does not satisfy the policy. This is shown formally below. THEOREM 3.3.1. Every satisfiable, statically enforceable policy is RW ≈ -enforceable.
PROOF. Let a policy P be given that is both satisfiable and statically enforceable. Since P is satisfiable, there exists a program M 1 such that P(M 1 ) holds. Define a total function R : TM → TM by
R is total because it assigns a TM to every M , and it is computable because P is statically enforceable and therefore, by Theorem 3.1.1, recursively decidable. R satisfies RW1 because its range is restricted to programs that satisfy P. Finally, R satisfies RW2 because whenever
holds because M ≈ M holds by the reflexivity of equivalence relations. We conclude that P is RW ≈ -enforceable.
Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.3.1 together imply that the intersection of class EM orig with the RW ≈ -enforceable policies includes all satisfiable, statically enforceable policies.
The policies in EM orig that are RW ≈ -enforceable policies also include policies that are not statically enforceable, but only for certain notions of PM-equivalence. Program-rewriting is only an interesting method of enforcing security policies when PM-equivalence is a relation that cannot be decided directly. For example, if PM-equivalence is defined syntactically (i.e., two PMs are equivalent if and only if they are structurally identical) then any modification to the untrusted PM produces an inequivalent PM, so RW2 cannot hold. The following theorem shows that if PM-equivalence is a recursively decidable relation, then every RW ≈ -enforceable policy that is induced by some detector is statically enforceable. Hence, there is no need to use program rewriting if PM-equivalence is so restrictive. PROOF. Exhibit a finite procedure for deciding P, thereby establishing that P is statically enforceable by Theorem 3.1.1.
Given M an arbitrary PM, P(M ) can be decided as follows. Start by computing R(M ), where R is the program rewriter given by the RW ≈ -enforceability of P. Next, determine if M ≈ R(M ) which is possible because ≈ is recursively decidable, by assumption. If M ≈ R(M ) then RW2 implies that ¬P(M ) holds. Otherwise, if M ≈ R(M ) then P(M ) holds by the following line of reasoning:
∀σ : σ ∈ ω :P(χ M (σ ) ) (by 1 and 2) (3) P(M ).
(by 3)
Thus, P(M ) has been decided in finite time and we conclude by Theorem 3.1.1 that P is statically enforceable.
In real program rewriting enforcement mechanisms, program equivalence is usually defined in terms of execution. For instance, two programs are defined to be behaviorally equivalent if and only if, for every input, both programs produce the same output; in a Turing Machine framework, two TMs are defined to be language-equivalent if and only if they accept the same language. Both notions of equivalence are known to be 2 -hard, and other such behavioral notions of equivalence tend to be equally or more difficult. Therefore we assume PMequivalence is not recursively decidable and not coRE in order for the analysis that follows to have relevance in real program rewriting implementations.
If PM-equivalence is not recursively decidable, then there exist policies that are RW ≈ -enforceable but not statically enforceable. P boot of Section 2.2, is an example. A rewriting function can enforce P boot by taking a PM M as input and returning a new PM M that is exactly like M except just before every computational step of M , M simulates M for one step into the future on every possible input symbol to see if M will exhibit any prohibited event {e i |0 ≤ i < 512}. If any prohibited event is exhibited, then M is terminated immediately; otherwise the next computational step is performed.
If PM-equivalence is not coRE, then program rewriting can be used to enforce policies that are not coRE, and therefore not enforceable by any EM. 
Observe that policy P U is RW ≈ T M -enforceable because we can define R(M ) = def M U . Rewriting function R satisfies RW1 because P U (M U ) holds, and it satisfies RW2 because if P U (M ) holds then M ≈ T M M U by construction. We next prove that P U is 2 -complete, and therefore not coRE.
A TM with an oracle that computes the ≈ T M relation can trivially compute P U . We now prove the reverse reduction: A TM with an oracle that computes P U can compute the ≈ T M relation. Define O U to be an oracle that, when queried with M , returns true if P U (M ) holds and false otherwise. 
The proof of Theorem 3.3.3 gives a simple but practically uninteresting example of an RW ≈ -enforceable policy that is not coRE. Examples of non-coRE, RW ≈ -enforceable policies having practical significance do exist. Here is one.
The Secret File Policy: Consider a file system that stores a file whose existence should be kept secret from untrusted programs. Suppose untrusted programs have an operation for retrieving a listing of the directory that contains the secret file. System administrators wish to enforce a policy that prevents the existence of the secret file from being leaked to untrusted programs. So, an untrusted PM satisfies the "secret file policy" if and only if the behavior of the PM is identical to what its behavior would be if the secret file were not stored in the directory.
The policy in this example is not in coRE because deciding whether an arbitrary PM has equivalent behavior on two arbitrary inputs is as hard as deciding whether two arbitrary PMs are equivalent on all inputs. And recall that PMequivalence (≈) is not coRE. Thus an EM cannot enforce this policy. 9 However, this policy can be enforced by program rewriting, because a rewriting function never needs to explicitly decide if the policy has been violated in order to enforce the policy. In particular, a rewriter function can make modifications that do not change the behavior of programs that satisfy the policy, but do make safe those programs that don't satisfy the policy. For the example above, program rewriting could change the untrusted program so that any attempt to retrieve the contents listing of the directory containing the secret file yields an abbreviated listing 9 Moreover, an EM cannot enforce this policy by parallel simulation of the untrusted PM on two different and only inputs, one that includes the secret file and one that does not. This is because an EM must detect policy violations in finite time on each computational step of the untrusted program, but executions can be equivalent even if they are not equivalent step-for-step. Thus, a parallel simulation might require the EM to pause for an unlimited length of time on some step. that excludes the secret file. If the original program would have ignored the existence of the file, then its behavior is unchanged. But if it would have reacted to the secret file, then it no longer does.
The power of program rewriters is not limitless, however; there exist policies that no program rewriter can enforce. One example of such a policy is given in the proof of the following theorem. THEOREM 3.3.4. There exist non-coRE PM-equivalence relations ≈ and policies that are not RW ≈ -enforceable.
PROOF. Define policy P NE (M ) = def (∃σ : σ ∈ ω : M (σ ) halts) and define ≈ T M as in the proof of Theorem 3.3.3 (i.e. ≈ T M is defined to be languageequivalence for TMs). Observe that policy P NE is RE but not recursively decidable. We show that if P NE were RW ≈ T M -enforceable, then it would be recursively decidable-a contradiction.
Expecting a contradiction, assume that P NE is RW ≈ T M -enforceable. Then there exists a rewriting function R satisfying RW1 and RW2. Use R to decide P NE in the following way: Let an arbitrary PM M be given. To decide if P NE (M ) holds, construct a new PM M that treats its input tape as a positive integer i followed by a string σ . (For example, if the input alphabet = {0, 1}, then iσ might be encoded as 1 i 0σ . Thus, every possible input string represents some valid encoding of an integer-string pair, and every integer-string pair has some valid encoding.) Upon receiving iσ as input, PM M simulates M (σ ) for i steps and halts if M (σ ) halts in that time; otherwise M loops. Next, compute R(M ). Since R satisfies RW1, there exists a string on which R(M ) halts. Simulate R(M ) on each possible input string for larger and larger numbers of steps until such a string j σ is found. Next, simulate M (σ ) for j steps. We claim that P NE (M ) holds if and only if M (σ ) halts in j steps. If M (σ ) halts in j steps, then obviously P NE (M ) holds. If M (σ ) does not halt in j steps, then M ( j σ ) loops by construction. Since M ( j σ ) loops but R(M )( j σ ) halts, it follows that R(M ) ≈ T M M . By RW2, P NE (M ) therefore does not hold. Thus, we have used R to decide P NE for arbitrary M , contradicting the fact that P NE is not recursively decidable. We conclude that no such R exists, and therefore P NE is not RW ≈ T M -enforceable.
The ability to enforce policies without explicitly deciding them makes the RW ≈ -enforceable policies extremely interesting. A characterization of this class in terms of known classes from computational complexity theory would be a useful result, but might not exist. The following negative result shows that, unlike static enforcement and EM orig , no class of the arithmetic hierarchy is equivalent to the class of RW ≈ -enforceable policies. PROOF. The proof of Theorem 3.3.3 showed that the 2 -hard policy P U is RW ≈ T M -enforceable. Theorem 3.3.4 showed that the RE policy P NE is not RW ≈ T Menforceable. Since 2 is a superclass of RE, there is no class of the arithmetic hierarchy that includes P U but not P NE . We conclude that the class of RW ≈ T Menforceable policies is not equivalent to any class of the arithmetic hierarchy.
EXECUTION MONITORS AS PROGRAM REWRITERS
Since EMs can be implemented by program-rewriters as in-lined reference monitors [Erlingsson and Schneider 2000a] , one might expect EM orig to be a subclass of the RW ≈ -enforceable policies. However, in this section we show that there are policies in EM orig that are not RW ≈ -enforceable. In Section 4.1 we identify some of these policies and argue that they cannot actually be enforced by EMs either. Thus, EM orig is a superclass of the class of policies that EMs can enforce. In Section 4.2 we then show how the definition of RW ≈ -enforceable policies presented in Section 3.3 can be leveraged to obtain a precise characterization of the EM-enforceable policies.
EM-Enforceable Policies
When an EM detects an impending policy violation, it must intervene and prevent that violation. Such an intervention could be modeled as an infinite series of events that gets appended to a PMs execution in lieu of whatever suffix the PM would otherwise have exhibited. Without assuming that any particular set of interventions are available to an EM, let I be the set of possible interventions. Then the policy P I , that disallows all those interventions, is not enforceable by an EM. If an untrusted program attempts to exhibit some event sequence in I , an EM can only intervene by exhibiting some other event sequence in I , which would in itself violate policy P I .
10 Nevertheless, P I is a member of EM orig as long as I satisfies EM1-EM4.
For example, Schneider [2000] presumes that an EM intervenes only by terminating the PM. Define e end to be an event that corresponds to termination of the PM. The policy P {e end} , which demands that no PM may terminate, is not enforceable by such an EM even though it satisfies the definition of EM orig . In addition, more complex policies involving e end , such as the policy that demands that every PM must exhibit event e 1 before it terminates (i.e. before it exhibits event e end ) are also unenforceable by such an EM, even though they too are members of EM orig . The power of an EM is thus limited by the set of interventions available to it, in addition to the limitations described by the definition of EM orig .
The power of an EM is also limited by its ability to intervene at an appropriate time in response to a policy violation. To illustrate, consider a trusted service that allocates a resource to untrusted programs. When an untrusted program uses the resource, it exhibits event e use . Once the service has allocated the resource to an untrusted program, the service cannot prevent the untrusted program from using the resource. That is, the service cannot revoke access to the resource or halt the untrusted program to prevent subsequent usage. However, untrusted programs can assert that they will no longer use the resource by exhibiting event e rel , after which the service can allocate the resource to another untrusted program.
To avoid two untrusted programs having simultaneous access to the resource, we wish to enforce the policy that the assertions denoted by e rel are always valid. That is, we wish to require that whenever an untrusted program exhibits event e rel , no possible extension of that execution will subsequently exhibit e use . This would, for example, ensure that no untrusted program retains a reference to the resource that it could use after exhibiting e rel . Formally, we definê
and we wish to enforce the policy P RU induced byP RU1 . Enforcing this policy would allow the enforcement mechanism to suppress event e rel when the untrusted program might continue to use the resource, and thereby prevent the service from unsafely allocating the resource to another untrusted program.
One would expect that policy P RU is not EM-enforceable because detector P RU1 is undecideable. Determining, for an arbitrary execution of an arbitrary PM, whether there exists some extension of that execution for that PM that exhibits event e use , is equivalent to solving the Halting Problem. However, policy P RU is a member of EM orig because the definition of EM orig demands only that there exists a detector satisfying EM1-EM4 that induces the policy, and there is another detector that does so:
DetectorP RU2 rejects executions that have an e use subsequent to an e rel . This detector induces the same policy P RU because any PM that has an execution that violates detectorP RU1 will also have a possibly different execution that violates detectorP RU2 . Inversely, every PM that has only executions that satisfyP RU1 will also have only executions that satisfyP RU2 . ThusP RU1 andP RU2 cause the same set of PMs to be accepted or rejected even though they are violated by different executions of those PMs that are rejected.
However, if an EM were to use detectorP RU2 to enforce policy P RU , it would not be able to prevent two untrusted programs from simultaneously using the resource. An EM using detectorP RU2 would only discover that an execution should be rejected when the untrusted program attempts to exhibit e use after having exhibited e rel in the past. At that point the service might have already allocated the resource to another untrusted program and would not be able to revoke the resource from either program. DetectorP RU2 is therefore violated at a time too late to permit the enforcement mechanism to guarantee that all executions satisfy detectorP RU1 . Violations ofP RU1 are detected by the EM but cannot be corrected.
In conclusion, an EM can "enforce" policy P RU in a way that honors detector P RU2 , but not in a way that honors detectorP RU1 . The definition of EM orig is insufficient to distinguish between a policy induced byP RU1 and one induced bŷ P RU2 because it places no demands upon the set of executions that results from the composite behavior of the EM executing alongside the untrusted program.
The result should be a set of executions that all satisfy the original detector, but EM1-EM4 can be satisfied even when there is no EM implementation that can accomplish this.
The power of an EM derives from the collection of detectors it offers policy writers. A small collection of detectors might be stretched to "enforce" all coRE policies according to the terms of EM orig , but in doing this, some of those policies will be "enforced" in ways that permit bad events to occur, which could be unacceptable to those wishing to actually prevent those bad events. Proofs that argue that some real enforcement mechanism is capable of enforcing all policies in EM orig are thus misleading. For example, the MaC system was shown to be capable of enforcing all coRE policies [Viswanathan 2000 ], but policies like P RU cannot be enforced by MaC in such a way as to signal the violations specified byP RU1 before the violation has already occurred.
In Section 4.2 we show that the intersection of class EM orig with the RW ≈ -enforceable policies constitutes a more suitable characterization of the EMenforceable policies than class EM orig alone. This is because RW1 and RW2 impose constraints upon an EMs ability to intervene. For example, in a setting where EMs can intervene by suppressing events that would otherwise be exhibited by an untrusted PM, one might model such interventions by an event e supp(e ) that is exhibited whenever an EM suppresses event e . If EMs cannot suppress e use events, one might wish to enforce policy P RU defined by
By RW1, policy P RU is only RW ≈ -enforceable if there exists a rewriting function that produces PMs that both satisfy policy P RU and that never suppress any e use events. Such a constraint on allowable interventions is not expressible using axioms EM1-EM4 alone because those axioms do not regard the new set of executions that results from an EMs intervention upon an untrusted PM. Characterizing the EM-enforceable policies as the intersection of class EM orig with the RW ≈ -enforceable policies therefore allows us to express policies that regard the whole system rather than just the the part of the system that does not include the EM. That is, it allows us to reify the EM into the computation and consider policies that regard this new composite computation rather than just the computation defined by the untrusted PM's behavior in isolation. A enforcement mechanism can only be said to "enforce" a policy if it neither allows any untrusted PM to violate the policy, nor itself violates the policy in the course of "enforcing" it.
This approach also allows us to confirm the intuition that if a policy is EMenforceable, it should also be enforceable by an in-lined reference monitor. That is, it should be possible to take an EM that enforces the policy and compose it with an untrusted program in such a way that this rewriting process satisfies RW1 and RW2. Axioms RW1 and RW2 require that the computation exhibited by the rewritten PM must satisfy the policy. That is, the composite computation consisting of the original PM's behavior modified by the EM's interventions must satisfy the policy to be enforced. 
Benevolent Enforcement of Execution Policies
To account for the additional restrictions upon EMs described in Section 4.1, it will be useful to identify those detectors for which there is some means to enforce the policies they induce without producing executions that violate the detector. Formally, we define a detectorP to be benevolent if there exists a decision procedure MP for finite executions such that for all PMs M :
A detector that satisfies B1 and B2 can be implemented in such a way that bad events are detected before they occur. In particular, B1 stipulates that an EM implementing detectorP rejects all unsafe execution prefixes of an unsafe PM but also permits it to reject unsafe executions early (e.g., if it is able to anticipate a future violation). B1 even allows the EM to conservatively reject some good executions, when a PM does not satisfy the policy. But in order to prevent the EM from being too aggressive in signaling violations, B2 prevents any violation from being signaled when the policy is satisfied. DetectorP RU2 of Section 4.1 is an example of a benevolent detector. The decision procedure MP RU2 (χ ) would simply scan χ and would reject if and only if e use was seen after e rel . However, detectorP RU1 of Section 4.1 is an example of a detector that is not benevolent. It is not possible to discover in finite time whether there exists some extension of execution χ that includes event e use (or, conservatively, whether any execution of χ has an e use after an e rel ). Therefore no suitable decision procedure MP RU1 satisfying B1 and B2 exists. Benevolent detectors can be implemented so as to prevent all policy violations without hindering policy-satisfying programs. In the next theorem, we prove that if a policy is both coRE and RW ≈ -enforceable for some equivalence relation ≈ that permits the sorts of program transformations that are typically performed by in-lined reference monitors, then every detector that induces that policy (and that is also consistent with ≈ and satisfies EM2) is benevolent. That is, no matter which detector might be desired for enforcing such a policy, there is a way to implement that detector so that all policy violations are prevented, but all executions of policy-satisfying programs are permitted. Thus, the class of policies that are both coRE and RW ≈ -enforceable constitutes a good characterization of the policies that are actually enforceable by an EM. Such policies can be enforced by an EM that is implemented as an in-lined reference monitor, whereas other coRE policies cannot be so implemented (because they are not RW ≈ -enforceable).
We prove this result by first defining a suitable equivalence relation ≈ IRM . We then prove that any detector that is consistent with ≈ IRM χ , that satisfies EM2, and that induces a policy that is both RW ≈ IRM -enforceable and coRE, is benevolent. Let ≈ IRM χ be an equivalence relation over executions such that χ 1 ≈ IRM χ χ 2 is recursively decidable 11 whenever χ 1 and χ 2 are both finite.
(EQ1)
and let ≈ IRM be the equivalence relation over programs defined by relation ≈ IRM χ using formula PGEQ. EQ1 states that although deciding whether two PMs are equivalent might be very difficult in general, an IRM can at least determine whether two individual finite-length execution prefixes are equivalent. EQ2 states that equivalent executions have equivalent prefixes where those prefixes might not be equivalent step for step, reflecting the reality that certain program transformations add computation steps. For example, an IRM is obtained by inserting checks into an untrusted program and, therefore, when the augmented program executes a security check, the behavior of the augmented program momentarily deviates from the original program's. However, assuming the check passes, the augmented program will return to a state that can be considered equivalent to whatever state the original program would have reached. PROOF. Define a decision procedure MP forP and show that it satisfies B1 and B2. We define MP as follows: When MP receives a finite execution prefix χ as input, it iterates through each i ≥ 1 and for each i,
where R is the rewriter given by the RW ≈ IRM -enforceability of P and σ is the string of input symbols recorded in the trace tape as being read during χ. Both of these executions are finite, so by EQ1 this can be determined in finite time. If the two executions are equivalent, then MP halts with acceptance. Otherwise MP simulates M P ( χ ) for i steps, where M P is a TM that halts if and only if its input represents a PM that violates P. Such a TM is guaranteed to exist because P satisfies EM1-EM4 and is therefore coRE by Theorem 3.2.1. If M P ( χ ) halts in i steps, then MP halts with rejection. Otherwise MP continues with iteration i + 1.
First, we prove that MP always halts. Suppose ¬P( χ ) holds. Then M P will eventually reach a sufficiently large i that M P ( χ ) will halt, and thus MP will halt. Suppose instead that P( χ ) holds. Then by RW2, χ
Recalling that χ is a finite prefix of χ χ (σ ) , observe that EQ2 implies that there exists a (sufficiently large) i such that χ ≈ IRM χ χ R( χ )(σ ) [..i] . Thus MP will halt. Now observe that the only time MP halts with rejection, ¬P( χ ) holds. Together with the fact that MP always halts, this establishes that MP satisfies B1.
Finally, we prove that if MP halts with acceptance, thenP(χ ) holds. If MP halts with acceptance, then χ ≈
This assumption can be relaxed to say that χ 1 ≈ IRM χ χ 2 is recursively enumerable (RE) without affecting any of our results. However, since assuming a recursively decidable relation simplifies several of the proofs, and since we cannot think of a program-equivalence relation of practical interest in which execution-equivalence would not be recursively decidable, we make the stronger assumption of decidability for the sake of expository simplicity. The existence of policies in EM orig that are not RW ≈ -enforceable can now be shown by demonstrating that there exist coRE policies with detectors that satisfy EM2 but that are not benevolent. By Theorem 4.2.1, no such policy can be both coRE and RW ≈ IRM -enforceable. PROOF. Define P {e end } as in Section 4.1 and defineP NT (χ ) = def P {e end } ( χ ). That is, an execution satisfiesP NT if and only if it comes from a program that never halts on any input. Define ≈ IRM χ to be the identity relation over executions, and observe thatP NT is consistent with ≈ IRM χ . DetectorP NT satisfies EM2 because for every program M , either all prefixes of all of that program's executions satisfyP NT or none of them do.P NT satisfies EM3 because if an execution falsifiesP NT , then every finite prefix of that execution falsifies it as well.
Define P NT to be the policy induced byP NT . Observe that P NT ≡ P {e end } by the following line of reasoning:
(by def ofP NT above)
(by def of P {e end } in Section 4.1)
By construction, P {e end } satisfies EM1-EM4; therefore P NT satisfies EM1-EM4. However,P NT is not benevolent. If it were, then the following would be a finite procedure for deciding the halting problem: For arbitrary M , decide if M ever halts on any input by computing MP NT (χ M (σ ) To summarize, the relationship of the statically enforceable policies, class EM orig (the coRE policies), and the policies enforceable by program rewriting (the RW ≈ -enforceable policies) is shown in Figure 2 . The statically enforceable policies are a subset of the coRE policies and, with the exception of the unsatisfiable policy, a subset of the RW ≈ -enforceable policies. The shaded region indicates those policies that are both coRE and RW ≈ -enforceable. These are the policies that we characterize as EM-enforceable. There exist coRE policies outside this intersection, but all such policies are induced by some non-benevolent detector. Thus, using an EM to "enforce" any of these policies would result in program behavior that might continue to exhibit events that the policy was intended to prohibit. There are also RW ≈ -enforceable policies outside this intersection. These are policies that cannot be enforced by an EM but that can be enforced by a program rewriter that does not limit its rewriting to producing in-lined reference monitors.
Figure 2 also shows where various specific policies given throughout this article lie within the taxonomy of policy classes. The policy "M terminates within 100 computational steps" given in Section 3.1 is an example of a policy that can be enforced by static analysis, execution monitoring, or program rewriting. Policy P boot , introduced in Section 2.2, is not enforceable by static analysis, but can be enforced by an EM or by a program rewriter. The secret file policy described in Section 3.3 is an example of a policy that cannot be enforced by any EM but that can be enforced by a program rewriter. Finally, policy P I is one of the policies given in Section 4.1 that satisfies the definition of EM orig but that cannot be enforced by any real EM in a way that prevents bad events from occurring on the system.
RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
Edit Automata. In contrast to program-rewriters, edit automata [Ligatti et al. 2003 ] modify executions rather than programs. Cast in the framework of this article, an edit automaton can intervene at each computational step by inhibiting any event a PM writes to its trace tape and/or writing additional events to the trace tape.
Like program-rewriters, the behavior of an edit automaton is constrained by an equivalence relation over executions. If a PM would have exhibited an execution that satisfied the detector that the edit automaton was to enforce, then any events suppressed or inserted by the edit automaton must result in a final execution that is equivalent to the one that the PM would have exhibited without those suppressions or insertions. But if the PM would have exhibited an execution that falsified the detector, then the edit automaton must suppress or insert events to produce an execution that satisfies the detector. Thus, similar to program-rewriters, edit automata must preserve the semantics of "good" executions while preventing "bad" executions.
To date, edit automata have been defined and analyzed only for a model in which all executions are assumed to be finite. In such a model, they can enforce any (computable) security policy by suppressing all events until the complete execution is observed, and then replaying or discarding the entire sequence to accept or reject it [Ligatti et al. 2003 ]. The same result holds true of all enforcement mechanisms in our model. If an enforcement mechanism can assume that all executions are finite, it can enumerate them all for any given PM and accept or reject the PM based on the resulting set of possible executions. The interesting computational problems in our model thus hinge upon the fact that complete executions are infinite.
Extending the definition of edit automata to include acceptance or rejection of infinite-length executions is the subject of ongoing research [Ligatti et al. 2005] . We conjecture that because edit automata could be implemented by programrewriters, they are probably capable of enforcing a subset of the class of RWenforceable policies.
Shallow History Automata. Fong [2004] investigates the power of execution monitors that are limited by the information that they can recall but that have no restrictions on their computational power. For example, shallow history automata can recall the set of events exhibited so far but not the exact order or number of events exhibited. These and other recall-limited EMs are modeled as automata bound by constraints EM1-EM3 as well as by recollection constraints. On each computational step they observe any security-relevant event about to be exhibited and either (i) accept, allowing the event to be exhibited and continuing the execution, or (ii) reject, preventing the event from being exhibited and terminating execution. As they decide whether to accept or reject, their recollection constraints render them unable to distinguish between certain finite execution prefixes previously observed. Thus they are weaker than the security automata defined in Schneider [2000] , which are constrained only by EM1-EM3.
For each different recollection constraint imposed on one of these automata, the automaton can enforce a different subclass of the class of policies defined by EM1-EM3. The set of all possible such constraints gives rise to a lattice of these subclasses [Fong 2004] . At the top of the lattice is the subclass equal to the entire class of policies given by EM1-EM3, corresponding to the automaton that can distinguish between every pair of execution prefixes. At the bottom of the lattice is the subclass consisting of all policies of the form P B for some set B of events as defined in Section 2.2-that is, policies that prohibit any of a set of "bad" events from being exhibited. Enforcing such a policy does not require the automaton to recall any history of past events that it observed.
The model proposed in Fong [2004] is incomparable with that presented in this article because it places no computational constraints on enforcement mechanisms and assumes that all executions are finite. However, if it could be extended to incorporate computational constraints and infinite executions, then this could be used to assess the power of execution monitors that have incomplete access to the event sequences they monitor, such as execution monitors that ignore some of the text of untrusted programs or that cannot observe all nondeterministic choices made by untrusted programs.
Proof-Carrying Code and Certifying Compilers. Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [Necula 1997; Necula and Lee 1996] and Certifying Compilers [Morrisett et al. 1999; Necula and Lee 1998 ] are emerging technologies for reducing the trusted computing base needed to enforce security policies. They make it easier for code consumers to enforce security policies by requiring code producers to add proof information to the code that they produce. It is thought easier to write trusted code for verifying proofs than to write trusted code for constructing proofs. PCC is therefore not a single kind of security enforcement mechanism, but rather a framework for reducing and perhaps relocating the trusted computing base. The reader may wonder what policies can be enforced in a PCC frameworkthat is, the reader may wonder how these technologies fit into the taxonomy of security policies presented in the previous sections. The model and analyses presented in this article can be used to explore that question, as we now show.
In a PCC framework, code transmitted to an untrusting code consumer is paired with a proof that the code satisfies whatever policy is being demanded by the code consumer. The code consumer checks that the proof is valid, that the proof concerns the object code, and that the proof establishes the desired policy, all in finite time. Once the code-proof pair has been checked, the code can safely be run without restriction by the code consumer.
The class of policies enforceable by PCC depends on the domain of all programs. For the code consumer, the domain of programs is the set of all object code-proof pairs that it might receive. The set of enforceable security policies over this domain are those properties of code-proof pairs that can be decided in finite time. This is the set of recursively decidable ( 0 = 0 ) properties of object code-proof pairs, or the statically enforceable policies. (Observe that some policies that are not recursively decidable for code alone are decidable for code-proof pairs. The proof provides extra information that reduces the computational expense of the decision procedure.)
Alternatively, a theorem prover in a PCC framework might consider the domain of programs to be the set of all object programs. The enforceable policies over this domain are those policies such that for all programs that satisfy the policy, there exists a proof that serves as a witness that the program satisfies the policy. For any proof logic characterizeable by some finite axiomization, this is the set of recursively enumerable ( 1 ) properties of that logic. (If an arbitrary program satisfies the policy, this can be discovered in finite time by enumerating all proofs to find a matching one. But if the program doesn't satisfy the policy, the enumeration process will continue indefinitely without finding a suitable proof.)
In practice, code-proof pairs are usually generated together by some automated procedure. For example, certifying compilers [Morrisett et al. 1999; Necula and Lee 1998 ] accept a source program and emit not only object code but also a proof that the object code satisfies some policy. If an arbitrary source program satisfies the policy to be enforced, then the certifying compiler must (i) compile it to object code in a way that faithfully preserves its behavior and (ii) generate a matching proof. If the source program doesn't satisfy the policy, then the compiler must either reject the program (which can be thought of as compiling it to the null program) or compile it to some program that does satisfy the policy, possibly by inserting runtime checks that cause the program to change behaviors when some policy violation would otherwise have occurred. These are precisely conditions RW1 and RW2 from the definition of the RWenforceable policies. Thus, if one considers the domain of programs to be the set of all source code programs received by a certifying compiler or other automated code-proof pair generator, then the set of enforceable policies are the RW -enforceable policies.
Future Work. The practicality of an enforcement mechanism depends on what resources it consumes. This article explored the effects of finitely bounding the space and time available to various classes of enforcement mechanisms. However, to be considered practical, real enforcement mechanisms must operate in polynomial or even constant space and time. So an obvious extension to the theory presented here is to investigate (i) the set of policies enforceable by program rewriting when the time and space available to the rewriter is polynomial or constant in the size of the untrusted program and (ii) rewriter functions that produce programs whose size and running time expands by no more than a polynomial or constant in the size and running time of the original untrusted program.
The results of this article might also be applied to real enforcement mechanisms. SFI [Wahbe et al. 1993 ], MiSFIT [Small 1997 ], SASI/PoET/PSLang [Erlingsson and Schneider 2000a; Erlingsson and Schneider 2000b] , and Naccio [Evans and Twynman 1999] implement program rewriting but typically assume extremely complex (and mostly unstated) definitions of program equivalence. These equivalence relations would have to be carefully formalized in order to characterize precisely the set of policies that these embodiments of program rewriting actually enforce.
Finally, the class of RW-enforceable policies outside of the coRE policies remains largely unexplored. To investigate this additional power, program rewriting mechanisms must be developed. These would need to accept policy specifications that are not limited to the monitoring-style specifications so easily described by a detector. Consequently, there are interesting questions about how to design a suitably powerful yet usable policy specification language for such a system. For example, various meta-level architectures like Aspect Oriented Programming [Kiczales et al. 1997] have been suggested as general frameworks for enforcing a variety of security policies Robben et al. [1999] , but it is not clear what class of security policies they can enforce.
SUMMARY
Our taxonomy of enforceable security policies is depicted in Figure 2 . We have connected this taxonomy to the arithmetic hierarchy of computational complexity theory by observing that the statically enforceable policies are the recursively decidable properties and that class EM orig are the coRE properties.
We also showed that the RW-enforceable policies are not equivalent to any class of the arithmetic hierarchy. The shaded region in Figure 2 is argued to be a more accurate characterization of the EM-enforceable policies than EM orig .
Execution monitors implemented as in-lined reference monitors can enforce policies that lie in the intersection of the coRE policies with the RW-enforceable policies. The policies within this intersection are enforceable benevolentlythat is, "bad" events are blocked before they occur. But coRE policies that lie outside this intersection might not be benevolently enforceable. In addition, we showed that program rewriting is an extremely powerful technique in its own right, which can be used to enforce policies beyond those enforceable by execution monitors.
APPENDIX
There are many equivalent ways to formalize TMs. We define them as 4-tuples:
-Q is a finite set of states. -δ is the TMs transition relation. (Since our TMs are deterministic, δ is a total function.) For each state in Q and each symbol that could be read from the work tape, δ dictates whether the PM halts (H), reads a symbol from the input tape and continues, or continues without reading a symbol from the input tape. If the TM continues without reading an input symbol, then δ specifies the new TM state, the symbol written to the work tape, and whether the work tape head moves left (−1) or right (1). Otherwise if an input symbol is read, it specifies all of the above (the new TM state, the symbol written to the work tape, and whether the work tape header moves left or right) for each possible input symbol seen. Thus δ has type 12 δ : Q × → ({H} (Q × × {−1, 1}) ( → (Q × × {−1, 1}))).
-q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state of the TM.
-B ∈ is the blank symbol to which all cells of the work tape are initialized.
The computation state of a TM is defined as a 5-tuple:
where q ∈ Q is the current finite control state; σ, κ ∈ ω are the contents of the input and work tapes; and i, k ≥ 1 are the positions of the input and work tape heads. Take TM M to be (Q, δ, q 0 , B). When M is provided input σ , it begins in computation state q 0 , σ, 1, B ω , 1 . The TM computation state then changes 12 Set operator denotes disjoint union. PMs are defined exactly as TMs except that they carry additional information corresponding to the trace tape. The computation state of a PM is defined as a triple:
q, σ, i, κ, k , τ, n where q, σ, i, κ, k is the computation state of a TM, τ ∈ * is the contents of the trace tape up to the trace tape head, and n ≥ 0 is a computational step counter. Initially, PM M = (Q, δ, q 0 , B) when provided input σ begins in computation state S, , 0 where S is the initial computation state of TM M for input σ and denotes the empty sequence. The PM computation state then changes according to the following operational semantics:
S, τ, n −→ PM S , τ T (M , σ, n + 1), n + 1 where S → TM S and T : TM × ω × N → * is a trace mapping satisfying the constraints on trace mappings given in Section 2.1. (A concrete example is given below.)
We illustrate by giving a concrete example of a PM. This requires first specifying a Turing Machine and then giving a suitable trace mapping. Let 0 be {0, 1, #}. Next define event set E 0 by E 0 = def {e s |s ∈ 0 } {e skip , e end } {e M |M ∈ PM}. E 0 is a countable set, so there exists an unambiguous encoding of events from E 0 as finite sequences of symbols from 0 . Choose such an encoding and let e denote the encoding of event e ∈ E 0 . To avoid ambiguities in representing event sequences, choose the encoding so that for all e ∈ E 0 , string e consists only of symbols in {0, 1} followed by a #. This ensures that there exists a computable function · :
ω → E ω such that for all i ≥ 0 and for all χ ∈ E i , e 0 · · · e i = e 0 . . . e i .
Finally, for all M ∈ TM, σ ∈ ω , and n ≥ 0, define trace mapping T 0 by T 0 (M , σ, n + 1) = def e skip otherwise. So, this trace mapping causes every PM M to write e M to its trace tape before its first computational step, write e s whenever it reads symbol s from its input tape, write e skip whenever it does not read an input symbol on a given computational step, and pad the remainder of the trace tape with e end if it halts.
For all M ∈ PM and σ ∈ ω , event sequence χ M (σ ) can be defined as
where τ is the limit as n → ∞ of . Therefore an enforcement mechanism could determine the sequence of events exhibited by a PM by observing the PMs trace tape. Figure 3 shows a program to increment binary numbers by 1, formalized as a PM along the lines we just discussed. The PM shown there treats its input as a two's complement binary number (least-order bit first), and writes that number incremented by one to its work tape. As the PM executes, it also writes the sequence of symbols dictated by trace mapping T 0 to its trace tape. So if the PM in Figure 3 were provided string 1101 as input, it would write 0011 to its work tape and write e M inc e 1 e 1 e 0 e 1 e # to its trace tape, followed by e end repeated through the remainder of the tape. A different PM M 0 that never reads its input would write to its trace tape e M 0 , then e skip for each computational step it takes, and finally e end repeated through the remainder of the tape.
We have given only one of many equivalent ways to formalize our program machines. Extra work tapes, multiple tape heads, multidimensional tapes, and two-way motion of the input tape head all yield computational models of equivalent power to the one we give. All of these models can simulate the operations found on typical computer systems, including arithmetic, stack-based control flow, and stack-and heap-based memory management. PMs can also simulate other PMs, which means they can perform the equivalent of runtime code generation. Program machines are thus an extremely flexible model of computation that can be used to simulate real computer architectures.
